Behavioral economics, notably developed by Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky and Richard Thaler, has found consistent and pervasive anomalies in common people's daily behaviors. This paper has employed the concepts in traditional economics (e.g., choice, relative price, and opportunity cost) to analyze the anomalies found in behavioral economics. The results show that quite a few anomalies, such as preference reversal, isolation effect and sunk cost fallacy, do not exist. This is not to say that people always make rational choices. The findings of the paper conclude, however, that common people may not be as irrational as behavioral economists have suggested (in some situations, common people may act more like a rational economist).
remarked, "If we had paid full price for those tickets we would have gone!" Thaler argues that "as an observation about human behavior he was right, but according to economic theory sunk costs do not matter. Why is going to the game more attractive if we have higher sunk costs?" (p.1266). However, Thaler's arguments are not correct. People have limited budget. Suppose that a basketball game ticket price is $40. A good meal for a person also costs $40. The cost (disutility) of driving through the blizzard of each person is: c ( d r i v i n g t o g a m e) . There are two possible scenarios in their consumption bundles:
Case 1: Instead of purchasing a ticket, the person purchases a good meal and receives a free ticket.
Case 2: Instead of spending $40 on a good meal, the person purchases a ticket.
In Case 1, the person could afford a basketball game ticket but did not purchase it. This implies that the utility of a basketball game (under not purchase) is less than the utility of a good meal, i.e., u _ (basketball game) < u(good meal). In Case 2, the person purchased a basketball game ticket and did not purchase a good meal. This implies that the utility of a basketball game (under purchase) is greater than the utility of a good meal, i.e., u (basketball game) >u(good meal). Since u _ (basketball game) <u(good meal)<u (basketball game), we have: u _ (basketball game) −c(driving to game) < u (basketball game) −c(driving to game)
It implies that [u _ (basketball game) −c(driving to game)] is more likely to be negative than [ u (basketball game) − c(driving to game)]. That is, comparing with buying a ticket, not buying a ticket but receiving it as a gift will be less likely to drive through a snowstorm to watch the game. In this example, the so-called sunk cost plays no role at all (i.e., they still have the choice to go or (treatment) the subject will choose in the second stage.
not to go to the game). Jeffrey acts more like an economist. Arkes and Blumer's (1985) experiment of theater ticket prices finds that after randomly assigning season tickets to theater goers, those paying more for their tickets attended significantly more plays within the first half of the season. They claim that this is because "these groups have different sunk costs" (p. 128), i.e., "I have spent so much money and I will use it more frequently". But spend less money on the season ticket also means that you have more extra money and time to do other activities which can produce utilities to compensate the loss of less theater going. 3 Ashraf, Berry and Shapiro (2010) employ a disinfectant product use experiment in Zambia to show that higher prices can increase use by a screening effect (targeting distribution to high-use households) but not by sunk cost effect (stimulating use psychologically).
Just, and Wansink's (2011) experiment of an all-you-can-eat pizza restaurant finds that "a 50% discount on the price of the meal led customers to consume 27.9% less pizza (2.95 versus 4.09 pieces). A second analysis indicated that individual taste ratings of this pizza tended to be inversely related to how much is consumed. One possible interpretation of these two findings is that individuals in a flat-rate (or fixed-price)
context may consume the amount that enables them to get their money's worth rather than consuming until their marginal utility of consumption is 0" (p. 193). People have limited budget (income). Higher price for disinfectant product means that you need to reduce your consumption of other goods in your consumption bundle (i.e., reduce utilities), which implies that you will increase the use of the product to gain more utilities to compensate the loss of the utilities. Lower price at the all-you-can-eat pizza restaurant means that you have more extra money to do other activities (e.g., go swimming) or buy other goods (e.g., an ice cream cone), which can bring utilities to compensate the loss of the utilities by consuming less pizza. Arkes et al. (1985, p. 124) define the sunk cost effect as "a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made. The prior investment, which is motivating the present decision to continue, does so despite the fact that it objectively should not influence the decision".
Thaler (1980, p. 47) defines the sunk cost effect as "paying for the right to use a good or service will increase the rate at which the good will be utilized, ceteris paribus". However, increasing use of a good or 3 For the second half of the season, Arkes et al. find that all the groups attend about the same number of plays. This may be due to that people in the second half of the season had new choices which can produce higher net utilities rather than 'diminishing sunk cost effect'. Gourville and Dilip Soman's (1998) experiment of gym memberships and attendance also finds that the price paid for an item has a diminishing effect on consumption behavior as time goes on, and there was a substantial spike in attendance following payment.
escalation of commitment to a failing course of action does not constitute a sunk cost effect (fallacy). A sunk cost fallacy occurs only when you make a choice without considering all other alternatives. For example, having the thinking: "My investment in this stock already lost 50,000 dollars. If I sell the stock now, I will never have the chance to recover my loss " without thinking about whether it is better to move the money from the stock to other alternatives. 4 Brockner, Shaw and Rubin (1979) use the example of waiting for a bus to show a sunk cost situation: after a very long wait, people still decide not to take a cab, thereby nullifying all the time they have spent waiting for the bus (time already spent waiting is a sunk cost). Northcraft and Wolf (1984) argue that continued investment in many of them does not necessarily represent an economically irrational behavior (e.g., continued waiting for the bus will increase the probability that one's waiting behavior will be rewarded). Note that even if continued waiting for the bus will not increase the probability of the arriving of the bus, continued waiting may still be a rational behavior:
As long as people's evaluation about which choice (waiting for the bus or taking a cab) is better does not change after a very long wait, continued waiting is rational.
Cost is Opportunity Cost
An opportunity cost is "the evaluation placed on the most highly valued of the rejected alternatives or opportunities" (Buchanan 2008) . Buchanan (1969, p. 43) emphasizes that "cost is based on anticipations;
it is necessarily a forward-looking or exante concept". 5 Thirlby (1946) argues that "cost occurs only when decisions are made, that is, in planning stages'' (p. 259). Thirlby clarifies the distinction between decision, budget, and accounting levels of calculation (Buchanan, 1969, p.32) :
(1) Cost is relevant to decision, and it must reflect the value of foregone alternatives.
(2) A budget reflects the prospective or anticipated revenue and outlay sides of a decision that has been made. It is erroneous to consider such prospective outlays as appear in a budget as costs. The budget must, however, also be distinguished from the account, which measures realized revenues and outlays that result from a particular course of action.
In summary, opportunity cost is ex-ante, implying that you still have the opportunity to make a choice. Thaler (1998) and Thaler (1999, p.191) has used an experiment of futures market of wine 4 See Appendix for a real story of the sunk cost fallacy. 5 Buchanan (1969, p.28) introduces Ronald Coase's definition of opportunity cost as: "Any profit opportunity that is within the realm of possibility but which is rejected becomes a cost of undertaking the preferred course of action". Thaler et al. argue that the correct answer according to economic theory is $75, since the opportunity cost of drinking the wine is selling it at that price (many economists who completed the survey also agreed).
But in this example, since a choice has already been made to drink the bottle, opportunity cost doesn't exist. 
Relative Price Ratio (or Rate of Return) Matters
In traditional economics, suppose that you have initial wealth w = $10,000. When w increases to $12,000, the relative wealth (price) ratio is: 12,000/10,000 = 1.2/1, which means you exchange 1 unit of wealth for 1.2 units of wealth or earn 20% rate of return. When $12,000 increases to $14,000, 14,000/12,000 = 1.167/1 means that you exchange 1 unit of wealth for 1.167 units of wealth or earn 16.7% rate of return. This indicates that a change of wealth can result in diminishing marginal utility of wealth. 6 Note that if for example, the initial wealth is w = $12,000 , the aggravation that people experience in losing $2,000 will be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining $2,000, i.e., losses loom larger than gains. This is because 1.2/1 > 1.167/1 means: (1) to increase wealth from $12,000 to $14,000 you need to earn only 16.7% rate of return; but (2) once your wealth drops from $12,000 to $10,000, you need to earn 20% rate of return to go back to your original position. 7 Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p.278) (and Thaler, 1980) argue that:
Example 7. The difference in value between a gain of $100 and a gain of $200 appears to be greater than the difference between a gain of $1,100 and a gain of $1,200. Similarly, the difference between a loss of $100 and a loss of $200 appears greater than the difference between a loss of $ Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) claim that "… utility theory. In that theory, for example, the same utility is assigned to a wealth of $100,000, regardless of whether it was reached from a prior wealth of $95,000 or $105,000.
Consequently, the choice between a total wealth of $100,000 and even chances to own $95,000 or $105,000 should be independent of whether one currently owns the smaller or the larger of these two amounts" (p. 273).
8 Thaler (1980, p. 50) argues that this is the Weber-Frechner law: the just noticeable difference in any stimulus is proportional to the stimulus. However, this law is an application of relative price ratio in decision-making. view of her personal wealth should be driven by her net worth-the difference between her assets and debts. Holding constant her overall worth, the level of assets and debt should not matter". They find:
Example 9. Financial profiles with higher levels of assets and debt are viewed as wealthier when overall net worth is negative (e.g., $50,000 in assets and $100,000 in debt is preferred to $20,000 in assets and $70,000 in debt) while profiles with lower levels of assets and debt are viewed as wealthier when overall net worth is positive (e.g., $70,000 in assets and $20,000 in debt is preferred to $100,000 in assets and $50,000 in debt). This is another example of relative price ratio where people pay attention not only to net worth:
Case 1. Negative net wealth:
asset/debt = 50,000/100,000 = 0.5/1 > 20,000/70,000 = 0.286/1. This means that for $50,000 in assets and $100,000 in debt, if default, every one dollar of debt can get 0.5 dollars back;
and for $20,000 in assets and $70,000 in debt, if default, every one dollar of debt can only get 0.286 dollars back. Thus, higher levels of assets and debt are viewed as wealthier.
Case 2. Positive net wealth:
asset/debt = 100,000/50,000 = 2/1 < 70,000/20,000 = 3.5/1. This means that for $100,000 in assets and $50,000 in debt, every one dollar of debt is covered (protected) by 2 dollars;
and for $70,000 in assets and $20,000 in debt, every one dollar of debt is covered (protected) by 3.5 dollars. Thus, lower levels of assets and debt are viewed as wealthier.
Some Applications:
Prospect Theory Kahneman and Tversky's (1979, p. 268) in the domain of gains (i.e., in Example 10) and risk seeking in the domain of losses (i.e., in Example 11), and hence, "the value function for changes of wealth is normally concave above the reference point and often convex below it" (p. 278).
However, it may not be: "people will show risk aversion in the domain of gains". In Example 10, two points regarding the increment ($1000 = $4,000 − $3,000) of increment ($3,000) should be noted:
(1) The difference between a gain of 0 and a gain of $3,000 is greater than the difference between a gain of $3,000 and a gain of $4,000. This is because 3,000/1 > 4,000/3,000 = 1.333/1 implies that 33.3%
rate of return of $3,000 becoming $4,000 is much smaller than 300,000% rate of return of $1 becoming $3,000.
(2) People have a 80% chance to increase the increment from $3,000 to $4,000 but also have a 20% chance to lose the original increment $3,000. 3,000 dollars is a large amount of money which may afford a couple a four-day tour of Paris. 10
Based on these two points, people will be very reluctant to choose the risky choice (A).
For Example 11, another two points should be noted:
(1) The difference between a loss of 0 and a loss of $3,000 is greater than the difference between a loss of $3,000 and a loss of $4,000 because 3,000/1 > 4,000/3,000 = 1.333/1 implies that 33.3% rate of return of $3,000 loss becoming $4,000 loss is much smaller than 300,000% rate of return of $1 loss becoming $3,000 loss.
(2) People have a 20% chance to win back the original lost $3,000 but also have a 80% chance to increase the loss from $3,000 to $4,000. Losing $3,000 in your budget could be very painful because you have to determine which commodities you should sacrifice.
Based on the above two points, people will be more willing to choose the risky choice (A).
The following experiment is used to examine whether a small amount (relative to people's budget) of gain and loss affects people's decisions: 11
Example 12. People are asked to choose from: 10 In Kahneman et al. (1979) , 3,000 is the median net monthly income for a family in Israel currency (p. 264). 11 This experiment was done at Xi'an Jiao Tong University in 2018. The number of the subjects (most are undergraduates) is 158. CNY3,000 is about the median monthly income of a new college graduate. CNY3 is the price of a lottery. The author wishes to thank Professor Qin, Botao for his help in designing this experiment.
(A) 80% chance to win CNY4,000 and 20% chance to win nothing;
[ 2 1 % ] (B) gain CNY3,000 for sure.
[67%]
(C) indifferent between (A) and (B).
[12%]
Example 13. People are asked to choose from:
(A) 80% chance to lose CNY4,000 and 20% chance to lose nothing;
[61%] [22%]
It shows that when the amount of the outcomes is big (i.e., Examples 12 and 13), the results are similar to Kahneman et al.'s (1979) (i.e., Examples 10 and 11). But when the amount of the outcomes is very small (i.e., Examples 14 and 15), most subjects chose the risky choice (A). This indicates that with small outcomes (which equals the price of a lottery), people will take the games as an entertainment (play for fun) because these outcomes (gains or losses) will not affect people's consumption levels. 12
Note that if the gain and loss of a game are small relative to people's budgets, people usually will not be interested in it. Friedman and Savage (1948, p. 279) argue that "an individual who buys fire insurance on a house he owns … is choosing certainty in preference to uncertainty", and "an individual who buys a lottery ticket … is choosing uncertainty in preference to certainty". Their arguments are not accurate. An individual could possibly buy both fire insurance and lottery ticket because the insurance premium and lottery ticket price are small relative to her budget. Also, buying a lottery ticket can provide her a chance/choice (even if it's very small) to become a millionaire, and buying a fire insurance can give her a 12 Thlaer and Johnson's (1990) experiment find that a large majority of subjects prefer temporal separation of gains to have them occur together. They also find that most subjects prefer temporal separation of losses to have them occur together. This may due to the fact that large sum of loss could seriously affect people's consumption levels (life style). People will prefer to amortize the loss to separate periods (as companies always do to avoid a big drop in their stock prices).
chance/choice to avoid the possibility of losing a big fortune which will affect her consumption levels. Kahneman and Tversky's (1979, p. 281 ) experiment of buying lotteries and insurance finds that people prefer a 0.1% chance of $5,000 to a certain gain of $5, but also prefer a certain loss of $5 to a 0.1% chance of losing $5,000. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose the probability weighting function to explain this result. The weighting function overweights low objective probabilities and underweights high objective probabilities. In addition to use a specific function to consider overweighting and underweighting, we can also use the Gordan (Arbitrage) theory to estimate these probabilities. 13 Chang (2018) has shown that the probabilities ( and 1 − ) of the following equation of the Gordan theory are the real world subjective probabilities:
where is the certainty equivalent, is the value at state 1, is the value at state 2, and is the risk-free interest rate. In Gonzalez and Wu's study (1999) , subjects state an average certainty equivalent of $10 for a 0.05 chance of $100, and $63 for a 0.9 chance of $100. From eq. (1) where the risk-free interest is 0, we can estimate: 10 = × 100 + (1 − ) × 0 and p = 0.10 , 63 = ′ × 100 + (1 − ′) × 0 and p′ = 0.63. That is, people's subjective probabilities overweights low objective probabilities and underweights high objective probabilities.
Endowment Effect
Suppose that you just bought a pen for $10. How much are you willing to sell it for? The answer should be more than $10. This is because when you decided to use $10 to buy the pen, you must prefer the pen to $10, i.e., u(pen) >u($10). Hence, when you sell it, you will ask more than 10 dollars, i.e., willing to accept (WTA) is greater than willing to pay (WTP). 14 This result has nothing to do with the psychological aspect of endowment effect, which emphasizes that once you own a thing, you may feel 13 Chang (2015, p. 41) has shown the Gordan theory as:
Let be an × matrix. Then, exactly one of the following systems has a solution:
System 1: > 0 for some ∈ S y s t e m 2 :
14 Microeconomics states that if a good is a normal good and hence a non-Giffen good, then WTA is greater than WTP. When there is no income effect, WTA and WTP are equal.
attached to it.
Many experiments have shown that WTA is much greater than WTP. Thaler's (1980) rare fatal disease experiment find that when subjects are told that they had been exposed to a fatal disease and that they now face a 0.1% chance of painless death within two weeks. They must decide how much they would be willing to pay for a vaccine, to be purchased immediately. The same subjects were also asked for the compensation they would demand to participate in a medical experiment in which they face a 0.1% chance of a quick and painless death. The result shows that for most subjects the two prices differed by more than an order of magnitude. Hanemann (1991) argues that large WTA-WTP disparity can also arise from low substitutability between the environmental good and each of the private goods in the individual's utility function. However, large gap between WTA and WTP could be due to that the good you plan to give up (to sell) interconnects with many other goods in your original consumption bundle (e.g., take the risk of a quick death versus a plan to get marry or a trip to Disneyland with your family; no more beautiful scenery outside your house versus entertaining friends in your house). Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler's (1990) experiment is to give half of subjects mugs and another half none, and then ask them at what price they are willing to sell (WTA) and at what price they are willing to buy (WTP). They find that median selling prices are about twice median buying prices. Note that this may be because once a mug is given to a subject, it enters into the subject's consumption bundle and the subject has a plan for it (e.g., put it on a shelf or give it to her mom as a souvenir). When an individual has a high expectation for getting a good (or a job), if she fails, it will greatly disappoint her because she might already have a plan for it. Cohen and Knetsch (1992) find that in tort law judges make the distinction between loss by way of expenditure and failure to make gain, e.g., the plaintiff was able to recover wages paid to employees which were considered "positive outlays" but could not recover lost profits which were merely "negative losses consisting of a mere deprivation of an opportunity to earn an income". Knetsch and Sinden's (1984) endowment effect experiment find that after subjects were selected at random to receive either $3 or a lottery ticket, of those initially given a lottery ticket 82 percent chose to keep it, and 62 percent of those given the $3 would not give it up. Samuelson and Zeckhauser's (1988) 
Procrastination
Procrastination is defined as "when present costs are unduly salient in comparison with future costs, leading individuals to postpone tasks until tomorrow without foreseeing that when tomorrow comes, the required action will be delayed again." (Arkerlof, 1991, p. 1) . The reason why people postpone their works, i.e., treasure present more than tomorrow, is that they can have more choices to make a better arrangement for today and tomorrow tasks, although procrastination sometimes could lead to serious losses. For example, the poverty of the elderly may be due to inadequate saving for retirement. But have not saved enough at young age may not be an irrational decision. After all, no one is sure how long she/he can live.
Also, even if spend a bit more money in this month, people still have a chance to earn those money back in the future. 15 Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein and Thaler's (1997) survey of cab drivers finds that the number of hours that a driver works on a given day is strongly inversely related to his average hourly wage on that day, i.e., drivers establish a target earnings level per day, and they will tend to quit earlier on good days.
This behavior may not be irrational since keep on working for the rest of the day cannot provide windfall gains (i.e., cannot affect divers' consumption levels too much). Besides, unexpectedly high wages in the morning are not necessarily correlated to the earnings in the afternoon.
Thaler (2018, p. 1265) provides an example of self-control problem: "At a dinner party for fellow economics graduate students I put out a large bowl of cashew nuts to accompany drinks while waiting for dinner to finish cooking. In a short period of time, we devoured half the bowl of nuts. Seeing that our appetites (and waistlines) were in danger I removed the bowl and left it in the kitchen pantry. When I returned everyone thanked me". Again, people may feel that they can start a diet plan the next day (they have choices). Also, they are unsure what the main dish is and how it tastes like. If the main dish and the bowl of cashew nuts are served simultaneously, people will not eat that much cashew. 16 15 Barberis (2013) suggests that "upon receiving a negative income shock, the individual prefers to lower future consumption rather than current consumption. After all, news that future consumption will be lower than expected is less painful than news that current consumption is lower than expected." (p. 188). 16 This is not to say that self-control problem does not exist. For example, DellaVigna, and Malmendier (2006) use a data of three U.S. health club to find that "members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over $70 attend on average fewer than 4.5 times per month. They pay a price per expected visit of more than $17, even though they could pay $10 per visit using a ten-visit pass. On average, these users forego savings of over $600 during their membership" (p. 716).
